Laneside, Then Left a Bit? Britain's Secret Political Talks with Loyalist Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, 1973–1976 by CRAIG, Tony
Dr Tony Craig  October 2012 t.craig@staffs.ac.uk  
 
1 
 
Laneside, then left a bit? Britain’s secret political talks with Loyalist 
paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, 1973-76. 
Abstract 
 
This article examines talks that took place between British government officials 
and loyalist paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland at a critical moment in the 
most recent Troubles. In particular, this article describes talks that took place 
secretly at the Northern Ireland Office’s ‘Laneside’ building, a secluded 
suburban house used by British diplomats and MI6 officers on the shores of 
Belfast Lough between 1971 and 1976. Drawing on both recently released 
archive material as well as interviews with those who worked at and visited 
Laneside, this article explores what went on at these talks and analyses their 
outcomes from three different perspectives. This article demonstrates that the 
most accurate perspective from which to view what occurred in these meetings 
is neither top-down (government led), nor bottom-up (paramilitary led), but  
one that looks at what went on there as part of a conversation which both sets 
of participants for a time found useful. For the Loyalists, Laneside had a role as 
a venue to think about strategy (rather than negotiate ends). For the British 
these were conversations that were useful in furnishing their understanding of 
loyalism, and as a place where policies could be explained and problems better 
understood. Looking at what occurred at Laneside as a semi-autonomous 
governmental body in Northern Ireland reveals key insights into both the loyalist 
paramilitaries’ political ideas as well as the aims of British policy in Northern 
Ireland. Furthermore this middle perspective holds a mirror up to the more 
familiar talks then occurring between the very same British officials and the 
Provisional IRA. 
 
Keywords: Northern Ireland, Peace talks, Loyalism, Ulster Volunteer Force, Ulster Defence 
Association, Ulster Workers Council Strike.  
 
Between 1971 and 1976 British government officials based in offices and accommodation at 
a house outside Belfast known as ‘Laneside’ discreetly conducted dialogue with the widest 
possible variety of political groups in Northern Ireland. Laneside therefore is almost 
exclusively known for the various talks organised from there between the British and the 
Provisional IRA. Laneside’s work, however, also brought it into very close contact with 
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loyalist paramilitaries and their representatives in this era, many of whom would go on to 
have long careers in loyalist politics or community work in Northern Ireland. Despite this, 
British involvement in loyalist politics is entirely missing from all three of the (otherwise 
excellent) major academic studies into the recent history of loyalism (Bruce, 1994; Nelson, 
1984 & Spencer, 2008).  Papers released by both the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) and the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), however, clearly demonstrate the importance 
attached to talking with loyalists following Labour’s election victory in March 1974. They 
also demonstrate the early political ambitions of the loyalist paramilitaries as they emerged 
in the 1970s. While papers from Laneside occasionally hint at attempts being made to 
strengthen political loyalism against Ian Paisley’s emergent DUP, this ‘mainstreaming’ of 
loyalist leaders was not the dominant feature of the talks that took place there.   
This paper will look first at the idea that Laneside was actively trying to mould and 
influence the emerging leaders of loyalism (a top down approach) before looking at how it 
was accepted that the loyalist leaders arrived at Laneside with pre-determined aims and 
intentions, and in fact proved difficult to influence (a bottom-up approach). Finally the 
paper will look at the aims and ambitions of those who worked at Laneside in an attempt to 
look at what went on there from the middle (the perspective of the talks themselves). In 
doing so the article demonstrates that, despite having no defined objective, Laneside 
nevertheless had a function in allowing the paramilitaries to vocalise their political ideas and 
ambitions and that those who attended talks there demonstrated a longer-term tendency 
toward politicising themselves away from the use of violence.  
A good example of this long term tendency can be found in a 1979 photo essay in 
the Observer Magazine on prominent loyalists entitled ‘At home with the UDA.’ (Observer 
Magazine, 16 December 1979). Three of the ten men featured (Andy Tyrie, Glen Barr and 
Dr Tony Craig  October 2012 t.craig@staffs.ac.uk  
 
3 
 
Tommy Lyttle) had played an active role in the talks with British officials. Lyttle and Tyrie 
continued in the upper ranks of the UDA until the late 1980s when Tyrie retired and Lyttle 
was replaced after it emerged he had become an RUC informant. After leaving Ulster 
Vanguard, Barr became a leading light in the New Ulster Political Research Group (at the 
time the UDA’s political wing). Barr contributed significantly to the production of their 
independence manifesto Beyond the Religious Divide in 1979 before returning to 
community work in Derry for which he would receive an OBE for his cross community work 
in 2005. Of others involved, the UVF’s Hugh Smyth became leader of the Progressive 
Unionist Party from 1979 to 2002 and was Lord Mayor of Belfast 1994/95, Billy Mitchell 
(though imprisoned for murder from 1976 to 1990) went on to work in community 
mediation and restorative justice; he aided the PUP during the negotiations that led to the 
Good Friday Agreement and was deeply involved in the UVF finally announcing the end of 
its military campaign in 2007 (Belfast Newsletter, 4 May 2007). Among Laneside’s contacts 
only Ken Gibson would fail to become a political or community figure within the loyalist 
community. Gibson’s Volunteer Political Party faired so badly with the voters in 1974 that it 
undermined the UVF’s own self-image and Gibson played no further role in political or social 
movements after 1975.   
 
From the perspective of British policy in Northern Ireland, this article demonstrates 
that Laneside was being used in support of the public political process evinced by the 
Sunningdale Communiqué (that initiated a power-sharing executive) and the later 
Constitutional Convention. Despite the seeming contradiction in holding separate 
discussions with unelected paramilitary groups, Laneside, though it had little authority, used 
its influence at this time to implement the stated policy of the UK government. Laneside’s 
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role was to support the establishment of sustainable political institutions in Northern 
Ireland whatever the main political parties there decided upon. Such political institutions 
required a stable peace which, it had become apparent, could not be imposed by the simple 
removal or internment of Northern Ireland’s gunmen. Laneside was therefore involved in 
the pacification of paramilitary groups by encouraging them to organise political parties, 
listening to their viewpoints and explaining the benefits of the government’s position. 
Laneside was not the site of political collusion that later did so much damage to relations 
between HMG and the nationalist community, though nor was it the murky lair of Britain’s 
secret officials bypassing the democratic structures of Northern Ireland to some great 
unknown end that another recent work has labelled it (Ramsay, 2009: 85).  
From the historiographical perspective the notion that loyalist paramilitary groups 
had ambitions beyond local defence in the 1970s is a controversial one. Only Sarah Nelson’s 
1984 work ever really examined these ambitions thoroughly but was later criticised for 
taking these views too seriously. Steve Bruce wrote that ‘Nelson ... makes the mistake of 
giving more attention to the political thinking of some UVF leaders than the UVF gave’ and 
he dismisses the relevance of the Volunteer Political Party (VPP) by describing it out of hand 
as simply ‘a curious animal’ (Bruce, 1994: 99).  Unfortunately (and in contrast to much new 
work on Republicanism) this view of the loyalists in the 1970s has become the axiomatic 
basis for more recent analyses; even the constructive and comprehensive work of Graham 
Spencer, which successfully injects the role of loyalists into analyses of the Peace Process, 
dates the point at which loyalist paramilitary groups began considering their political role in 
a peaceful Northern Ireland to 1988 (Spencer, 2008: 1) rather than 1974. This research 
demonstrates that a more contiguous line can be drawn between 1974 and the Good Friday 
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Agreement of 1998, and that Spencer’s thesis regarding the longevity of loyalist attempts at 
serious political engagement can safely be extended.  
With so much focus, then and now, on violent republican groups in Northern Ireland, 
talks with loyalists, their nature, their substance and their ambitions have arguably been 
overlooked. By studying them and attempting to understand what took place, one can learn 
much about both how Loyalists saw themselves at this crucial stage as well as how talks 
elsewhere might have been conducted. It is hoped that an examination of these available 
papers, might hold a mirror up to the talks Laneside officials were also conducting with the 
Provisional IRA at the same time, the British accounts of which remain largely in the hands 
of SIS/MI6. 
 
The Origins of Laneside 
In July 1971, after almost two years of residence at the Conway Hotel in south-west Belfast, 
the Office of the UK Representative in Northern Ireland (UKREP) moved to Laneside. The 
house there, near Craigavad, offered a view over Belfast Lough, a large garden, swimming 
pool, easy access to Stormont and the protection of the nearby Palace Barracks. In October 
1971 Frank Steele, an MI6 officer, arrived at Laneside to provide extra assistance to the then 
UKREP, Howard Smith, in the wake of the introduction of internment without trial. Steele’s 
arrival was linked with Britain’s need to better understand what was happening inside 
Northern Ireland at the grass-roots level. The UKREP, whilst he maintained intimate 
connections with the main political and religious leaders, required someone who could dig 
deeper particularly into the nationalist community so that parliamentary politics could 
usefully resume. The task of the officials based at Laneside was therefore to make contacts 
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with those whose views were important, but which were not directly voiced in the course of 
normal representative politics (Craig, 2012: 101-103). 
 In 1972, with the swift descent into violence that led to the suspension of the 
Northern Ireland Parliament at Stormont, Laneside passed from the hands of the redundant 
UKREP to the newly established Northern Ireland Office under Secretary of State William 
Whitelaw. Whitelaw’s Permanent Under-Secretary, Frank Cooper, asked that Laneside 
continue its role in establishing community contacts and, in line with this, Laneside was to 
play a vital role in the Provisional IRA’s short-lived ceasefire of July 1972 (Taylor, 1997: 128-
147). When it came time for Steele to leave Northern Ireland he was replaced by two new 
arrivals. James Allan, a diplomat, was tasked with handling the overt business conducted at 
Laneside while Michael Oatley, another MI6 officer, built upon the more secretive contacts 
Steele had originally made. Laneside itself continued to be used as a venue for informal 
discussions with Northern Ireland’s political parties.  
 Although loyalist paramilitarism had emerged in the late 1960s, it was not until the 
early 1970s that it became a wider movement with significant community support in 
reaction to increased Irish republican violence. Glen Barr recalls that the Ulster Defence 
Association arose from small vigilante groups that had organised spontaneously in 
Protestant council estates from 1970 on. Their initial concern was ‘protection, at that time 
everyone was looking for protection’ (Interview with Glen Barr, 2010). With an estimated 
membership of up to 80,000 the vigilante UDA soon had enough committed members to 
form a more secretive paramilitary group, the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) which emerged 
first in May 1972 (Wood, 2006: 21).  These groups were increasingly violent and 
unpredictable, they also had reputations for being poorly led and internal chaotic. They 
were also deadly; assorted loyalist paramilitaries were responsible for 461 deaths between 
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1969 and 1976, 359 of which have been attributed to the UDA/UFF and UVF groups 
(Sutton/CAIN, 2012).   
 The problem Laneside’s officials faced when dealing with Protestant paramilitaries in 
1972 and 1973 was therefore not simply that unionism had shattered so completely in 
urban working class areas, but that the members of these new groups had not previously 
engaged openly with the politics of Northern Ireland. There was a knowledge deficit within 
the Northern Ireland Office as to who controlled whom, how much support they had, and 
what their views were on the issues at stake in the main political talks. And although by 
1973 the British government were clear as to what the Provisional IRA wanted, this was not 
the case with loyalist paramilitaries. Thus, when it seemed unionism was again beginning to 
condense around opposition to the Sunningdale Agreement in 1974, Laneside was tasked 
with exploring the views of the more radical loyalist groups. These groups included both the 
Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). 
Under the management of Allan and Oatley, contacts were made with potential 
representatives of loyalist groups initially through those elected within the neighbourhoods 
these groups operated from. Such was the nature of these initial meetings their actual 
number is difficult to quantify accurately. Despite this, the only published estimate currently 
(three) (Sunday Business Post, 2 January 2005) significantly underestimates the number of 
recorded meetings that are available in the UK National Archives. A closer look at the 
records available reveals that between April and December 1974 Laneside staff held formal 
meetings with representatives of the UDA on at least eleven separate occasions.1 Ken 
Gibson, a prominent East Belfast UVF leader, also met the same officials at least seven times 
in the same period.2  
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 The sheer number of these meetings alone is evidence of Laneside’s determination 
to advance and support government policy and to garner support for the political process 
from all quarters.  
 
 ‘Mainstreaming’: The Top-down Approach 
Studies on negotiation and the use of backchannel talks in conflict situations may allow us 
to theoretically categorise what occurred at Laneside from the British government’s 
perspective. For Dean Pruitt there are five general and overlapping strategies available for 
dealing with terrorists groups. Governments, when faced with a terrorist campaign can 
either capitulate, combat and isolate, or mainstream and negotiate (Pruitt, 2006). And while 
Pruitt never explicitly discusses victory or defeat in his work (indeed such situations rarely 
arise in the types of ethno-national conflicts he is concerned with), the normative aim of his 
research is obviously toward the sustainable and peaceful resolution of all conflicts. Indeed 
Pruitt criticises the self-defeating tactics used in combating terrorist groups. He illustrates 
this well by citing Bruce Hoffman’s analysis of the Irgun’s fight to end British rule in 
Palestine: 
‘[Menachem Begin] banked on the fact that the massive disruptions 
caused to daily life and commerce by the harsh and repressive 
countermeasures that the British were forced to take would further 
alienate the community from the government, thwart its efforts to 
obtain the community’s cooperation against the terrorists, and 
create in the minds of the Jews an image of the army and the police 
as oppressors rather than protectors.’ (Hoffman, 1998: 52) 
 
 
 For Pruitt, state actors benefit from marginalising, mainstreaming and negotiating; and 
should seek to end ethno-national conflicts by granting concessions to key supporters in an 
effort, to lure extremist groups into normal politics, to undermine their violent wings and 
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eventually, to negotiate a settlement. This process may first begin through the use of secret 
talks.   
 Reading the papers relating to Laneside’s loyalist talks through this lens one can see 
that with the coming of Labour’s minority government following the first general election of 
1974 (March) the new Northern Ireland Secretary, Merlyn Rees, his Permanent Under 
Secretary, Sir Frank Cooper, and his Junior Minister Stan Orme, set about engaging loyalist 
paramilitary groups in an attempt at just this kind of mainstreaming. Orme saw in some 
elements of loyalist thinking the same working-class solidarity upon which he had based his 
own political career, and one that needed a legitimate channel of communication with the 
government. Within weeks of taking office both the Ulster Volunteer Force and Sinn Féin 
were therefore ‘de-proscribed’ and Laneside opened channels of communication with both 
these groups. To do this, contacts were established through broader umbrella organisations 
from which the paramilitaries were soon siphoned off. 
 The first meeting recorded in the National Archives occurred between Rees’ 
announcement of the end of the ban on UVF and Sinn Féin membership but before the 
Commons vote on this matter had taken place. The meeting took place on 9 April 1974 at 
the NIO’s main offices at Stormont Castle between Stan Orme and what was billed as ‘a 
deputation led by Mr Hugh Smyth.’ Smyth, later leader the Progressive Unionist Party (1979-
2002) was elected to the Northern Ireland Assembly in June 1973 on a West Belfast Loyalist 
Coalition ticket (Whyte, 2009). The group also however included unelected senior UVF 
leaders and spokesmen including Ken Gibson and Billy Mitchell.3  
 The meeting began with an exploratory conversation on the opening up of further 
talks as soon as possible. To this end, Ken Gibson spoke of the UVF’s concern that 
internment should be ended, particularly the internment of six of its most able political 
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thinkers. Orme preferred to talk about his view that he could help ‘the working class 
Protestants to find their own political feet’, and when challenged by the fact the fact that no 
working class Protestants had been represented at the Sunningdale conference, Orme 
responded passionately, that in his view:  
‘out of the shattered edifice of the Unionist Party, the working class 
Protestants and the working class Catholics were struggling to find some 
political leadership of their own ... at the next election there was no 
reason why the UVF might not have a number of members elected to 
the Assembly and indeed why they might not be a member of the 
Executive’4 
   
At the end of meeting Hugh Smyth pointed out that two of the members of his delegation 
were ‘wanted members of the UVF.’ He asked that these men be allowed to return safely to 
their homes and though Orme gave no reassurance on this point, it served to highlight the 
irregular nature of the meeting. Despite their declared ceasefire at the end of 1973 (Taylor, 
2000: 138) the UVF had still been responsible for the deaths of between eleven and fifteen 
people between December and this meeting on 9 April 1974 (Sutton/CAIN, 2012) and those 
who represented the British government at this meeting were fully aware that the UVF 
ceasefire was not being seriously adhered to. 
Although not proscribed until the 1990s, the UDA was brought into talks in a similar 
way, through a willing elected representative, in their case Assembly member for 
Londonderry, Glen Barr (Whyte, 2009). Barr had been a trade union official at Coolkeeragh 
power station outside Londonderry and had helped organise vigilante groups within 
Protestant estates in the city prior to his election for Vanguard in June 1973. After the 
collapse of the Loyalist Association of Workers’ Barr moved to the Ulster Workers’ Council 
(UWC) and within days of their May 1974 strike beginning had become chairman of its co-
ordinating committee. Barr too remembers Stan Orme’s agenda as being complementary to 
Dr Tony Craig  October 2012 t.craig@staffs.ac.uk  
 
11 
 
his own ideas, and indeed, as members of the very same trade union (the AEU) it is less 
surprising that later Orme would make special visits to see Barr at his own home on behalf 
of the Secretary of State.5 Barr and Orme agreed on a great number of issues. Barr, for 
example, credits Orme with convincing him of the need to accept voluntary coalition later in 
1976– in effect, power-sharing – a controversial view which led Ulster Vanguard to split 
from the last remaining institution of Protestant solidarity, the United Ulster Unionist 
Council (UUUC). This demonstrates something of Orme’s reasoned influence over left-wing 
elements of Vanguard and Barr still remembers that ‘Stan Orme and me communicated 
quite a bit ... Stan and I got on very well.’ (Interview with Glen Barr, 2010) 
The context in which these first meetings took place was the UWC Strike of 15-28 
May 1974. Initially, prominent UDA figures appeared at meetings with NIO officials under 
the thinly veiled guise of loyalist trade unionists and gave their affiliations as workers at 
Rolls Royce or Mackie’s Engineering6 (the UDA’s Andy Tyrie and Tommy Lyttle) although 
Barr was also present and spoke frequently on their behalf.  
 For the UVF, contacts with the British moved even more swiftly. Ken Gibson – who 
had also attended the 15 May meeting along with Tyrie and Barr – was invited back for a set 
of three private talks between 21 and 29 May. James Allan, who conducted these talks on 
behalf of the NIO, later stated that, his instructions were to simply talk and to pass any 
pertinent information up the line to the NIO, ‘I was told to have friendly chats up the 
chimney so to speak.’ (Interview with James Allan, 2010) 
This first set of talks with the UVF took place just days after the UVF detonated the 
bombs in Dublin and Monaghan on 17 May that killed 33 civilians. Strangely however, talk 
did not turn at any stage to these atrocities despite the blame already being levelled at 
loyalists (Daily Telegraph, 18 May 1974). Instead, the meeting focused on the issue of 
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paramilitary roadblocks around Belfast during the strike although Gibson also spoke of his 
aim to find a ‘non-violent’ future role for the UVF.7  
Only days after Prime Minister Harold Wilson had publicly described the UWC as 
‘spongers on British democracy’ and accused loyalists of treachery (Wilson, 1974), Gibson 
was able, at Laneside, to voice his deep concern to these British officials at what he 
perceived as the sidelining of the UVF from the mainstream of unionist politics.  Allan noted 
that, ‘the UVF delegation found it difficult to articulate their demands.’8 Without any such 
demands, and with the overt disgust of the British Prime Minister, there seemed little to talk 
about. James Allan noted his puzzlement by the UVF’s attitude toward their talks at 
Laneside and commented: 
‘The UVF’s relationship with us has become very strange. They are 
desperately in need of advice as to how to achieve their aims of 
ensuring working-class, and above all UVF, participation in politics and 
they seek this from us even though they know there are basic 
differences between them and HMG on the strike.’9   
 
Adding to this confusion over intentions, when the strike ended with UWC victory on 28 
May, the UVF began in earnest to organise their own ‘Volunteer Political Party’ and they 
again went straight to Laneside to discuss their options. There they spoke first to James 
Allan again (showing him a printed letter for distribution to ‘their own people’ regarding the 
founding principles of their party) before being escorted in for a personal meeting with the 
Secretary of State. Concern that Gibson was perhaps cosying up to Allan and Michael Oatley 
was expressed by John Falls, part of Gibson’s delegation, when on leaving he expressed his 
concern that ‘what the UVF or VPP were saying [to Allan and Oatley] might be repeated to 
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others.’ Allan and Oatley reassured the men that ‘it was a firm rule that confidence 
exchanged with one [Laneside contact] were not repeated to another.’10    
When the meeting recommenced in the presence of the Secretary of State, Gibson 
explained that the VPP had been established ‘to ensure a counter balance’ at the United 
Ulster Unionist Council ‘by the creation of a genuine working class party ... [and that] they 
saw themselves as progressive socialists.’ 11 They sought the release of three men they 
believed could help them organise their political activity and supported power sharing with 
the minority. Merlyn Rees told the VPP that he would look into the releases and both parties 
agreed to deny the meeting had taken place.  
Although Allan’s notes reveal the potential for the UVF to be used to gain 
information on the UUUC (and to fuel possible dissent there), he also convinced them that 
guarantees given to the UVF in order to ensure ‘working-class participation’ would later also 
require granting militant ‘Catholic’ [i.e. Republican] organisations seats on any future 
constitutional conference.12 This was not a deal Allan had the authority to make but in 
making this connection between the representation of militant working class Protestants 
and their Catholic equivalents,  it remains the only recorded evidence that Laneside had any 
active part in the socialising agenda evident in Stan Orme’s earlier meetings.  
Whilst in his autobiography Rees noted his desire ‘to bring the loyalist working class 
into the political arena’ (Rees, 1985: 92) the emphasis these minutes place on what these 
groups had to say for themselves is compelling.  There is no sense the VPP was perceived by 
the NIO as the Secretary of State’s client, and the emphasis on progressive socialism makes 
it feel more that Gibson was intent on impressing Rees, Allan and Oatley, rather than the 
other way around. Thus, this thesis, that Laneside was used to politicise the left wing of 
loyalism in a direct attempt to outmanoeuvre the unionist right wing (led by Ian Paisley, 
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William Craig and Harry West) is much too simple. For one thing it ignores the great 
differences between Britain’s representatives and the loyalists. Most importantly, it ignores 
agency within the loyalist groups themselves. The VPP’s affinity with the Labour Party was 
not one the Labour Party shared with them. Moving beyond ‘mainstreaming’ and looking at 
the role of Laneside from the Loyalist perspective itself, may therefore be a better way of 
explaining what occurred.  
 
Talks without ‘end’? The Bottom-up Approach 
 It is certainly apparent that after 1969 a new generation of working class Protestants, 
particularly in Belfast, became cynical with old forms of unionism. Ian Paisley’s blend of 
rhetoric and inaction left those who felt the need to defend their streets cold. For Sarah 
Nelson, ‘few [in the paramilitaries] were fighting to close the floodgates of sin’ (Nelson, 
1984: 66) and it is certainly true that many loyalists were angered at the sight of politicians 
leaving for the safety of their own homes at the end of every day, when they had spent their 
mornings making irresponsible or divisive speeches that aroused sectarian animosity. Andy 
Tyrie later commented, ‘there were no politicians in jail. And there were very few in the 
cemeteries.’ (O’Malley, 1983: 318)  
It also needs to be remembered that Belfast’s Protestant working classes had seen 
this before. In 1920 the new government of Northern Ireland at various points identified 
with, and then distanced itself from, loyalist violence in the shipyards and elsewhere 
(Parkinson, 2004: 31). Thus there was a retained sense of insecurity and distrust toward the 
unionist middle classes among sections of Belfast’s protestant working class.  
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Marc Mulholland has written that the generational shift that had contributed so 
actively in the revitalisation of nationalist politics had largely been stymied in the Protestant 
community. Here, a debate between Terence O’Neill and Ian Paisley, a debate between the 
right wings of unionism, had marginalised both the working class radicals as well as the 
kinds of middle class progressivists whose unionism was irreligious (Mulholland, 2010). In so 
doing it allowed for the (paradoxical) emergence of a new kind of militant  middle-ground in 
unionism. The resurgence of the UVF and the conglomeration of the local defence 
associations into the UDA in September 1972 were part of the manifestation of this 
working-class loyalism, but one that was not sold on the type of scaremongering schemes of 
the Paisleyites. These groups saw themselves as part of their distinctive working-class 
communities and had a sense ‘of being neglected by their own politicians and of being 
rejected by Westminster, [and from] there came the glimmer of a new consciousness’ 
(O’Malley, 1983: 318). Some also saw themselves as having a more permanent role within 
these communities. The emergence of Vanguard led by William Craig (though widely viewed 
as a party of the far right) offered a voice to unionists opposed as much to Paisley as to the 
predominance of conservative unionism and, beyond their regalia, some members were 
independent thinkers of a variety of hues, from Glen Barr to David Trimble(Mulholland, 
2010: 89).  Seen in this light, if the VPP was established by the UVF’s Ken Gibson to give a 
specifically working-class loyalist option to the electorate, then Glen Barr was working from 
within established unionism (the UUUC) to give the protestant working class a voice there.  
From the perspective of those that worked at Laneside, Barr was particularly well 
connected. He was a leading light in Vanguard, had been a vocal trade unionist and was 
active within the UWC; and as political advisor to the UDA he was a highly considered 
interlocutor at Laneside. From the bottom-up perspective however, Barr was there because 
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Barr wanted to be there. He had his own views, and his entry and exit from so many political 
movements over the years demonstrates a clear ideological standpoint, rather than loyalty 
to any particular organisation. Barr’s ideas on an independent Ulster – a minority view in 
both Vanguard and the UDA – typify a unique political approach that could be seen as self-
indulgent.13 But Barr’s trade union experience made him an excellent figurehead and a key 
UDA strategist whether or not all his political ideas were fully accepted.  
If Ken Gibson’s talks at Laneside demonstrate evidence of a nervous, clientelistic 
attitude, then the UDA’s talks there were often far more political and theoretical in content, 
though they achieved less from the perspective of the British government.  For Glen Barr, 
‘We were interested in talking about a whole range of things, but politics was the main one’ 
(Interview with Glen Barr, 2010). Unlike the UVF, Barr believes that, ‘we didn’t go looking for 
advice, we came to discuss. We told them our opinions – my theme was independence’ 
(Interview with Glen Barr, 2010). British notes of meetings with Barr and Tyrie at Laneside 
confirm this to an extent.  During a long meeting on 12 June 1974, Tyrie and Barr both 
expressed their desire that talks at Laneside include the IRA. They accepted the need for 
Catholics to participate in government and, while they rejected the idea of a United Ireland, 
they were happy to discuss a future in ‘either a federal Britain or an independent 
dominion.’14 On the 19 June, a second meeting with Tyrie and Barr focused on detention 
and again, unlike the UVF, they gave their opinions and philosophy and did not enter into 
negotiation of individual cases. Barr passed on a personal copy of the final statement of a 
loyalist conference he had attended earlier that day but James Allan told them that he ‘did 
not wish to comment officially since it was not for us [Oatley was also present] to 
interfere.’15 At a third meeting however on 21 June, Barr and Tyrie did begin to mention 
individual cases they were concerned with. These included rumours among the UDA in the 
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Maze prison that their food was being poisoned, an enquiry into the potential of the 
Northern Ireland Office (NIO) subsidising minibuses for visiting dependents of UDA 
prisoners, the imprisonment of Andy Beattie (who Barr contended ‘was a goodie’) and the 
personal matter of the extension of Barr’s own gun licence (and the granting of one for 
Tyrie).16   A month later, at another meeting at Laneside, patronage was back on the 
agenda. On his problems with the Unionist Party, Barr asked Allan ‘Could not the British 
Government do something to finally discredit them?’, while Tyrie asked that another of the 
UDA prisoners be released on compassionate grounds. As they were leaving Tyrie also made 
a request, ‘with just a note of seriousness’, that they be granted family holidays (though not 
to Cyprus) and for expenses to be paid for Barr’s car as he’d managed to write-off two in the 
preceding months driving to and from meetings at Laneside.17   
 For Barr, these personal requests were always unsuccessful. ‘We got nothing from 
them ... we were telling them what was going on in the streets, and we were going in to 
better our communities, not to better ourselves and that was the thing with us. Our 
principles were maintained, and were non-negotiable’ (Interview with Glen Barr, 2010).  
The question of patronage was in any case a double-edged sword as being seen to 
have powerful friends within such a volatile and physically dangerous political context as 
loyalism in the 1970s could quickly turn allies into enemies. Certainly there were no new 
cars, houses or honours emanating from what went on at Laneside, and the only physical 
benefit Tyrie gained was when he was allowed to pick a bunch of roses from the garden 
there.18 The only conclusion left therefore is that Laneside was not actively offering 
patronage or support to any of the loyalist groups. Permanent Under-Secretary at the NIO 
Frank Cooper was simply genuinely interested in understanding the fringes of unionism 
better, and used Laneside as a passive means of staying informed in case something of use 
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came up. For example, the document from the UWC conference Barr had passed on proved 
useful a fortnight later when a meeting was held with a group of UWC dignitaries that 
included a wide range of paramilitary and protestant vigilante groups.19  
 
Talks from the Middle: Laneside and Amelioration 
From this perspective, that Laneside was a passive listening post, and not a cloak and dagger 
intelligence station, one can look again at how loyalist talks began there. On 26 February 
1974, two days before the election that would bring Merlyn Rees to Northern Ireland as 
Secretary of State, Frank Cooper and Michael Oatley met with a small delegation of 
community activists from the Northern Ireland Labour Party. The NILP members who visited 
Stormont Castle that day however came expressly as individuals ‘who had been in contact 
with the leadership of Ulster Volunteer Force.’20  Out of dialogue begun by Rev. Stewart in 
Woodvale Methodist Church this group had identified ‘a genuinely moderate group ... 
within the UVF leadership [who] wished ... to bring the organisation’s influence to bear 
through political channels.’21 In a separate instance, Brian Garrett, a solicitor and member of 
the NILP also acted as an intermediary with elements of the UWC (Fisk, 1975: 84). Looking at 
what was done at Laneside with loyalist groups later (the intense listening, the provision of 
a venue for discussion, and the occasional piece of advice) it seems that these tentative 
intermediaries sparked Frank Cooper’s curiosity before the arrival of Merlyn Rees and Stan 
Orme under the new Labour government.  
In fact, months before the UWC Strike, a paper had been circulated in the Northern 
Ireland Office which also stated a preference for de-criminalisation of the UVF and secret 
talks. This discussion paper was written by Phillip Woodfield (NIO Deputy Secretary) just 
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before his return to the Home Office in early 1974.22 Woodfield carried unique authority in 
this area as he had played a key role in the 1972 Cheyne Walk talks with the Provisional IRA, 
(along with Laneside’s Frank Steele). Woodfield was thus one of a handful of officials who 
had spoken directly with the IRA.  
Although Woodfield wrote of pre-conditions to de-proscription, he also 
recommended, despite the risks, that preliminary contact should take place before the 
order was put to parliament. Woodfield hoped that preliminary talks with a wide range of 
opinion within these paramilitaries ‘might reveal something about the attitudes within the 
organisation.’23 He also recommended having strong intelligence that might indicate the 
level of an organisation’s involvement in terrorism and ‘its extent would help indicate the 
real strength of those within the organisation who opposed violence.’24 The aim of all talks 
however was the identification of moderates within organisations currently proscribed due 
to terrorist activity and de-proscription followed by a ‘substantial release’ of prisoners in 
order to ‘strengthen those in the organisation who favoured political, non-violent policies 
and reduce the risk of proponents of violence asserting themselves.’25 Of course this was 
only a discussion document at this stage and (upon his appointment) Merlyn Rees’s 
statement that he would never speak to the IRA (again) (Daily Telegraph, 7 March 1974) was 
taken relatively seriously, even at Laneside.26 The intense personal trust between Rees and 
Cooper however meant that the PUS always stood a chance of running a project without 
Rees’ scrutiny if needs required it. And, if not against the letter of Rees’ statement of 7 
March, talks with the loyalists were certainly against the spirit of what Rees spoke of.  
From this perspective, the talks at Laneside were not calculated to bolster the 
unionist left wing. More it was an attempt at amelioration that would, it was hoped, allow 
for a natural centre-ground in these groups to be found. Secret talks at Laneside joined its 
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public functions of entertaining the Press, holding social receptions for the elected elites of 
Northern Ireland, and meeting with peace and reconciliation groups. Talks with 
paramilitaries and their representatives (though seemingly incongruous) took place in this 
context, and thus they ‘were not borne from any cast iron object or method ... we were not 
working to a particular agenda ... We weren’t favouring any particular course’ (Interview 
with James Allan, 2010). Diplomats were specifically chosen for their unique skills in 
conversation and for their amiability. James Allan recollects, ‘they knew I could talk the hind 
leg off a donkey and something somewhere would emerge upon which their experts could 
get onto. My job was to be the listening post to everything and to report this accurately’ 
(Interview with James Allan, 2010). Allan’s considered view of those he spoke to was 
pragmatic: 
 ‘I didn’t personally attribute evil to the senior people I met in [any of] 
these organisations. That may have been my superficial attitude to evil, 
but I genuinely felt that I was just dealing with organisation men ... we 
weren’t counting the bodies because we weren’t at the hospitals ... 
[that] was the background of Northern Ireland.’ (Interview with James 
Allan, 2010)  
 
The object from Laneside’s perspective then was simply to stop people killing one another, 
not to negotiate major constitutional change and not to explicitly undermine Ian Paisley or 
William Craig. 
 Laneside did have some power (it had the ear of Frank Cooper), but this power was 
limited by its position as an appendix of the NIO. For example, as Merlyn Rees consistently 
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sought to end internment, he regularly released detainees and some of those released were 
undoubtedly identified by Cooper based on conversations with loyalists at Laneside.  
 
Maturity 
By early 1975 talks with the UDA in particular had became a mundane, routine practice. The 
IRA ceasefire that was arranged by Michael Oatley’s far more secret contacts with 
Republicans began to take up a much greater portion of Laneside’s time. Oatley even began 
bringing Allan along to meetings in Derry with members of the Provisional IRA’s Army 
Council. (White, 2006: 226). The stuttering PIRA ceasefire in the early weeks of 1975 
however led some Loyalists to become concerned that a deal was being done behind their 
backs. Andy Tyrie got in touch with Allan at Laneside and visited him there on the evening of 
26 February 1975.  This led to two further meetings the following day where the UDA 
delegation, that included Glen Barr, met with Frank Cooper and subsequently the Secretary 
of State.27 Whilst the initial topic that brought the UDA to Laneside and Stormont Castle was 
their concern over the opening of incident centres and their fear of the establishment of IRA 
police forces in Catholic areas, it soon became clear that their concern was mostly fear due 
to ignorance of what was going on. They had not anticipated an IRA ceasefire at all, and the 
implications of one made them nervous. Would they be picked-on now the police and army 
had so little to do? Was the IRA using the ceasefire and the more relaxed security measures 
to reequip their units in the province? Had the IRA made a secret deal with the British? 
Frank Cooper tried his best to allay the delegations’ fears of any sell out, ‘Provisional Sinn 
Fein’ he told them, ‘had exploited the situation cleverly. They had mounted a powerful 
propaganda effort which appeared to have taken in many people (including, by implication, 
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the UDA) ... [and that surely] it was better that they expend their energies in a political way 
than in terrorism.’28 Allan, Cooper and Rees failed in their attempts to allay the UDA’s fears 
and upon leaving these meetings Tyrie announced that they intended to police loyalist areas 
themselves from six p.m. the following evening (The Times, 28 February 1975).  
Division (both within loyalism generally and within the UDA particularly) in early 
1975 meant that Tyrie and Barr were bluffing this time round and in their final meeting with 
Rees, three hours before the scheduling patrols were due to begin, the delegates (which 
now also included Ken Gibson) sat amicably at Stormont Castle and listened to the Secretary 
of State carefully explain that ‘the Protestant community would not be sold down the 
river.’29  Reports of this second meeting suggest that the planned UDA patrols had been 
called off late the previous night due to a lack of support from within their own membership 
(The Times, 1 March 1975). Tyrie, in response, acted with a great deal more humility at this 
second meeting, knowing that any further threats he made would be empty. Tyrie was 
recorded to have remarked that ‘the atmosphere had been so pleasant that he had not 
found an opportunity to shout.’30 this was only half the truth.  
In the end, the IRA ceasefire – which itself was pockmarked by serious instances of 
violence – was met by an increased loyalist paramilitary campaign which included some of 
these groups’ most harrowing atrocities of the Troubles. The Volunteer Political Party, 
having achieved only 2,690 votes in the general election of October 1974 was wound up 
shortly after (Nelson, 1984: 187-188) when the UVF issued a new policy document that 
declared ‘attack as the best means of defence’ and calling on its activists to, ‘employ the 
same tactics as our enemy, but [to] be more ruthless and determined’ (Spencer, 2008: 62).  
While meetings with the Provisional IRA were to dominate Laneside’s work, it was 
personnel changes that probably served to undermine relations the most. Oatley was 
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replaced in March 1975 by a still unknown MI5 officer – referred to later as ‘the Horizontal 
Man’ because of his lack of enthusiasm for the work.  James Allan was replaced at Laneside 
by another diplomat, Donald Middleton, and a fifth, unnamed British conversant is also 
believed to have taken part.  There is some indirect evidence that meetings with loyalist 
leaders continued to take place31 although Laneside itself became noticeably less secure as 
the year went on.32 Merlyn Rees noted the great stir caused by Rev William Arlow’s 
repeated talk of Britain’s supposed intentions to withdraw (Rees, 1985: 231) and certainly 
the UWC were also vexed by Arlow’s talk (Fisk, 1975: 247). However, after their re-
proscription on 3 October 1975, the UVF leaked both the location and details of those they 
had contacted to the Press Association, and the New Statesman confidently ran a story 
about under the title ‘Mr Rees’s Decolonising Mandarins’ that concluded damagingly that 
‘for the (unelected) representatives of the bombers and gunmen there is always a cup of tea 
and a polite welcome for a chat in the civilised confines of Laneside.’ (New Statesman, 14 
November 1975: 604-5). 
 Though for a while the offices at Laneside continued to be used, talks with 
paramilitaries there became more consultative and prosaic after its cover was blown. In a 
series of meetings a week after the New Statesman article, the Convention Report, 
formulated by Northern Ireland’s main political parties, was presented in turn to several 
groups at Laneside. These meetings were designed to establish where these groups stood 
on the key issues but had nothing of the openness and intimacy that the minutes from 1974 
reveal. Andy Tyrie described to Middleton the feelings of virtual anomie among ‘the people’. 
He spoke openly and honestly, but ‘showed no curiosity as to the government’s position, 
and left his copy of the report on the table when the meeting closed.’33  
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The End of Laneside 
The sad case of the death of Sammy Smyth in March 1976 perhaps typifies the end of 
Laneside’s talks with paramilitaries in Northern Ireland. Smyth, a founding member of the 
UDA in 1972, had been in and out of Andy Tyrie’s circle of advisors and had been head of 
propaganda during the UWC strike. Thus he had been an occasional visitor to Laneside and 
was considered at one time, ‘an individual with influence among the paramilitaries and 
trade unionists [but] without an established power base.’34 Glen Barr described him more 
precisely as ‘an odd ball. He was always an odd ball’ (Interview with Glen Barr, 2010). 
Nevertheless Smyth was invited to Laneside in September 1975 so that Donald Middleton 
could hear out his ideas. He was invited back to talk about the Convention Report in 
November and turned up again in January 1976 where he spoke to Donald Middleton about 
his ‘latest ideas for a political solution in Northern Ireland.’ 35 Smyth came across throughout 
his meetings as a well-meaning community activist, but little else. Middleton’s view, once 
he’d met with Smyth was that he was little more than ‘an active busybody ... articulate but 
verbose’.36 Ultimately Smyth seemed harmless, if over-enthusiastic.  
 His meetings at Laneside however may have instilled in Smyth a greater sense of his 
own importance than he would otherwise have had. He was also at the time enrolled in a 
Master’s course in adult education, neither of which would have helped Smyth reel-in his 
inclination to blether. In a completely unguarded interview with Jamie Delargy (editor at the 
time of Gown the Belfast student newspaper) Smyth spoke of his belief that a civil war was 
imminent and that this would result in an expanded Northern Ireland from which Catholics 
would (at best) be expelled. In the interview he stated, ‘We will assume that Catholics are 
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fully armed and on that assumption we will take action against them.’ The interview was 
quickly reprinted in an issue of Republican News under the title ‘UDA Threaten Wholesale 
Slaughter’ (Republican News, 14 February 1976, reprinted from Gown, 6 February 1976) and 
within a month Smyth was dead, murdered by the IRA (Irish Times, 11 March 1976). Donald 
Middleton noted before the killing that he suspected in the interview that Smyth had been 
‘letting himself be carried away by his own eloquence’37 rather than expressing his true 
feelings. On his visits to Laneside Smyth had only ever spoken about his published notions 
regarding ‘community governance’ (Smyth, 1975).   
 Public records relating to Loyalist interaction at Laneside cease around this time. The 
end was not a direct result of the death of Smyth but the killing was certainly indicative of 
the upswing back toward violence that from late 1975 called into question talks with any 
paramilitary groups. While Merlyn Rees was to stay on as Secretary of State until September 
1976, Laneside itself was closed before the arrival of Roy Mason and his belief, laid bare 
before the 1976 Labour Party Conference that ‘Ulster had had enough of initiatives’ (Daily 
Telegraph, 18 April 2004). 
 
Conclusions  
Stan Orme always retained a private tendency toward Irish unification (Fisk, 1975: 63-64) 
and whilst this was an ambition he hid throughout his time as Junior Minister (with 
responsibility for Harland and Wolff), his pragmatism masked a broader goal of eventual 
Irish unity under the principle of consent. In a speech drafted on House of Commons 
notepaper (and which made up part of a subsequent debate) Orme noted ‘if the working 
class people of Northern Ireland can be convinced, that whatever their religious division, 
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they have economic interests in common, they will be able to approach the constitutional 
question of which the border is a small and long-term part, with open minds.’38  
 Orme’s tendency toward unification would not have endeared him to the shipyard 
workers of Belfast but nor do his papers show any long term affinity or the continuance of 
personal contacts in Northern Ireland after his period as Junior Minister there. Indeed the 
actual speech Orme gave that night in the House of Commons underlined his belief that 
unionism and trade unionism were incompatible. On Vanguard’s aim to garner working-
class support through an emphasis on an independent Ulster, Orme declared in the 
Commons that, ‘the airy-fairy scheme about setting up a little independent state ... is 
misleading tens of thousands of working-class Protestants‘ (Commons Debates, 846, 21 
November 1972, 1209). 
 Orme could have gone further in his attack on this emerging unionist subset in 1972 
had he wanted to. And the Labour Party itself were rarely considered pro-unionist.39 But 
compared with what went on at the talks at Laneside, Orme was still an advocate of Irish 
unity and his aims and ambitions were only temporarily hidden under the greater 
requirements of office. Unlike the government, Laneside in this respect was crucially neutral 
on the question of Ireland’s continued partition.  
 Neutrality in this sense, and on such a fundamental point as the partition of Ireland, 
can only exist when there is no predetermined aim or stance on the issue and there was 
none at Laneside. Dean Pruitt’s work on negotiation with terrorist groups does not allow for 
what went on at Laneside therefore to be effectively characterised. Whether it be through 
negotiation, capitulation, mainstreaming, combating or isolating, (Pruitt, 2006: 373-374) the 
object for Pruitt is defined – to either give, deny, or negotiate the defined aim of the 
terrorist group. Without a political aim in mind therefore, much of the work at Laneside was 
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toward the basic amelioration of problems and did not stick to any predetermined model of 
conflict resolution.  Diplomats, by not seeking to interfere in the goals of one organisation or 
another, and without any actual power to act, were thus the perfect arbiters of such 
discussion.  
 Furthermore, there was no link between Laneside and the various plans for British 
withdrawal written by Harold Wilson in conjunction with Bernard Donoughue and Andrew 
Graham (Craig, 2010: 176-181). Indeed, both Allan and Oatley profess that this had not 
occurred to them as a possibility during their time at Laneside. For Allan; ‘If Northern Ireland 
was being planned as an atomic test site I’d no way of knowing. It had never crossed my 
mind.’ (Interview with James Allan, 2010) And while this does not rule out what Frank 
Cooper might have known, the notion that Laneside was part of a deeper project beyond 
the gradual pacification of violent sub-political groups, is also refuted by this research.  
  Recently published research by Niall Ó Dochartaigh offers a delicately balanced view 
of the decision making context within which British talks with the IRA were conducted by 
Laneside’s officials. It concludes broadly that: 
 ‘British decisions were shaped by the reality of loyalist violence and the threat 
of its intensification, the intensity of Unionist and Conservative hostility to any 
settlement with the IRA and direct resistance by senior military and police 
figures to the scaling back of military activity and to the reform of policing’ (Ó 
Dochartaigh, 2011: 76)  
From the loyalist perspective, their parallel talks with the British were being conducted 
within a matrix that was even more complex and restrictive thus had outcomes that were 
even more limited. The main problem however was that the changing nature of Loyalism’s 
demands demonstrated their lack of a firmly constructed general objective. This all meant 
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that there was not even the pretence that these meetings were somehow negotiations that 
there was when Laneside officials met with the leaders of the Provisional Republican 
Movement.    
 Although no one personally involved in talks at Laneside would ever admit so, the 
very fact that the loyalists who participated in talks were given the opportunity to discuss 
their political ideas openly and without fear must surely have boosted their confidence and 
standing within the groups they represented. One can only accept prima facie Glen Barr’s 
assertion that he came ‘pre-cast’ to Laneside when those who emerged from talks there 
would later become the driving forces behind the Ulster Political Research Group and the 
PUP. In the end, Laneside was talking to the right people, many of them minor figures in 
1974, but who would remain the political strategists of loyalism for many years to come.  
 Despite this, Laneside was not a place where overt patronage was offered or given. 
The amelioration of basic problems and misunderstandings as they arose was the limit of 
what Allan, Oatley and Frank Cooper could offer the paramilitaries. In return, Laneside 
received information regarding the political disposition of groups and details of the political 
debates happening on the fringes of unionism. The proof of this lies in the small number of 
actual interventions Laneside officials made, their lack of authority within the NIO, and the 
ease with which the office was closed in 1976. Still, as a place where political ideas could be 
communicated in confidence, the Laneside experiment should be recognised in the history 
of loyalism as it increasingly is in the histories of the British Government (e.g. Powell, 2008: 
66-73) or of the Republican movement (e.g. Taylor, 1997 or Moloney, 2002) in Northern 
Ireland.    
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1 TNA:PRO, FCO 87/342, FCO 87/343 and FCO 87/344. Meetings with Laneside Officials (mostly James Allan) 
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2 TNA:PRO, FCO 87/341 and FCO 87/342. Meetings with Ken Gibson, UVF representative, occurred on 9 April, 
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3 TNA:PRO, FCO 87/341, ‘Note of a meeting between the Minister of State and a (UVF?) delegation led by Hugh 
Smyth in Stormont Castle’, 9 April 1974.  
4 Ibid.  
5 TNA:PRO, FCO 87/342, Meeting between the Minister of State and Mr Glen Barr, Londonderry, 25 June 1974.   
6 TNA:PRO, CJ 4/404, ‘Meetings with various loyalist delegations’, 15 May 1974, Stormont Castle,. Unofficial 
accounts of these meetings were first published in Fisk, 1975: 64-65. 
7 TNA:PRO, FCO 87/341, ‘Talk with Mr Ken Gibson of the UVF’, Laneside, 21 May 1974. 
8 TNA:PRO, FCO 87/341, ‘Meeting with UVF at Laneside’, 27 May 1974. Present at this meeting were Ken 
Gibson, John Falls, Tom West, Stanley Grey, James Allan (FCO) and Michael Oatley (MI6) 
9 Ibid.  
10 TNA:PRO, FCO 87/342, Meeting with Volunteer Political Party (with Allan and Oatley), Stormont Castle, 26 
June 1974, Kelvin White at the FCO’s Republic of Ireland department added his concern to this, noting in the 
margin, ’it seems that the VPP is going to be even more subservient to the UVF than the [sic] Sinn Fein is to the 
IRA.’ 
11 Ibid. 
12 TNA:PRO, FCO 87/341, ‘Meeting with UVF at Laneside’, 27 May 1974. 
13 TNA:PRO, FCO 87/341, ‘Talk with Mr Ken Gibson of the UVF’ Laneside, 21 May 1974. Ken Gibson described 
Barr’s approach as ‘hedonistic.’ 
14 TNA:PRO, FCO 87/342, ‘Meeting with G. Barr and A. Tyrie at Laneside’, 12 June 1974. 
15 TNA:PRO, FCO 87/342, ‘Note for the record’ Meeting with Barr and Tyrie at Laneside, 19 June 1974.  
16 TNA:PRO, FCO 87/342, Allan to Cooper, 25 June 1974, recording another meeting with Barr on 21 June.  
17 TNA:PRO, FCO 87/342, ‘Meeting with Messrs Glennie Barr and Andy Tyrie’ Laneside 22 July 1974.  
18 TNA:PRO, FCO 87/342, ‘Meeting with Messrs Glennie Barr and Andy Tyrie’ Laneside 22 July 1974. 
19 TNA:PRO, FCO 87/342, ‘Meeting with UWC Strike co-ordinating committee’, Stormont Castle, 7 August 1974. 
Represented at this meeting, beyond the UDA, UVF and Red Hand Commandos were Down Orange Welfare, 
the Orange Volunteers, the Ulster Service Corps, and the Ulster Special Constabulary Association. The 
Secretary of State, two of junior ministers (Orme and Donaldson), his PUS Sir Frank Cooper, Laneside’s James 
Allan and others represented the NIO.  
20 TNA:PRO, FCO 87/341, ‘Notes of Meeting with Northern Ireland Labour Party’ Stormont Castle, 26 February 
1974. Counsellor W. Boyd, D. McIldoon, A. Scott and Rev. J. Stewart. 
21 Ibid. 
22 De-proscription of the UVF and Sinn Fein had also been considered briefly by the Northern Ireland Office in 
early May 1973 but this was not implemented. See TNA:PRO, CJ 4/862.  
23 TNA:PRO CJ 4/643, Undated memorandum on de-proscription, Philip Woodfield, c. February 1974. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid.  
26 TNA:PRO FCO 87/342, ‘Meeting with Seamus Loughran at Laneside’, 9 July 1974.The first recorded meeting 
with British Officials and Sinn Fein at Laneside (with Seamus Loughran) did not occur until July 1974, although 
it is rumoured Jimmy Drumm and Billy McKee were earlier visitors.  
27 TNA:PRO, CJ 4/838, Meeting between Frank Cooper, James Allan and a UDA delegation, 27 February 1975. 
28 Ibid. 
29 TNA:PRO, CJ 4/2399, ‘Meeting between the Secretary of State and the Ulster Loyalist Central Co-ordinating 
Committee’, Stormont Castle, 28 February 1975. 
30 TNA:PRO, CJ 4/2399, ‘Meeting between the Secretary of State and the Ulster Loyalist Central Co-ordinating 
Committee’, Stormont Castle, 28 February 1975. 
31 In July 1975 contingency plans were laid down by the Northern Ireland Office due to ‘talk in Loyalist circles 
for preparations being made for Doomsday.’ TNA:PRO, CJ 4/1159 ‘Cabinet: Official Committee on Northern 
Ireland’, note by Northern Ireland Office, 3 July 1975,.  
32 LSE, REES 3/4. Merlyn Rees later commented that ‘Belfast was full of incestuous gossip. It was becoming a 
pastime for those wishing to look important.’  
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33 TNA:PRO, CJ 4/974, Laneside talks on Convention Report, third meeting, Andy Tyrie and John Orchin, 21 
November 1975.  
34 TNA:PRO, CJ 4/1359, Donald Middleton’s note on ‘Mr Sammy Smyth’s “Community Convention” Plan, 25 
September 1975. 
35 TNA:PRO, CJ 4/974, Laneside talks on Convention Report, fourth meeting, Samuel Smith, 23 November 1975. 
36 Ibid. 
37 TNA:PRO, CJ 4/1359, Middleton to Leahy, 19 February 1976. 
38 LSE Archives, Papers of Stanley Orme 1/3, ‘The Last Chance for Northern Ireland?’ c.17-23 November 1972.  
39 At the same debate Kevin McNamara had described Vanguard as ‘a queer sort of Nationalist Socialist body’, 
Harold Wilson had famously also once described Unionist MPs as ‘hacks supporting the English Tory Party’ 
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711, 6 May 1965, 1562. 
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